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This paper adds to the scarce evidence on the determinants of audit fees in European 
countries outside the UK. The paper examines audit fees paid by companies listed on the 
Copenhagen Stock Exchange in 2002, which is the first year in which the disclosure of 
both audit fees and other fees paid to the auditor at the consolidated group level has been 
required by the Danish Financial Statements Act.  Until 1/1-2005, listed companies are 
required to be audited by two independent auditors. Here, we have especially focused on 
the effect of this requirement on the pricing of audit fees. Our results indicate that having 
two independent auditors reduces total audit fees (most likely due to competitive 
pressure), but only for larger companies.  We have used the core audit fee determinants 
model, which is a result of international research, with generic proxy variables for client 
size, complexity, risk profile and auditor size. Our findings indicate similarities with 
respect to the determining factors, but again a distinction has to be made between large 
and small companies. In small Danish companies, client size and complexity in a formal 
technical sense are decisive, which might indicate that audits of such companies involve 
a relatively large proportion of accessory accounting services in the audit service. In the 
generic large company, other decisive factors than client size include complexity of 
substance and general client risk, indicating that the typical audit of such companies is to 
a greater extent planned as regards risk and materiality. In contrast to most previous 
international research, analyses of the Danish data showed no general Big Four effect. 
However, our results indicate that PWC is lowballing in large companies and 
highballing in small companies. Finally, our results confirm international findings of a 
positive association between other fees and audit fees. 
 
1.0 Introduction 
In Denmark, audit fee research based on published data was made possible by the Danish 
Financial Statements Act (2001), effective for financial statements from 2002. Prior to  
this, fee information was disclosed only in the company financial statements, which in 
Denmark, because of an accounting tradition that falls between continental European and 
Anglo-Saxon accounting, were considered equally important as consolidated financial 
statements.
1 It would be meaningless to analyze parent company disclosures, since these 
are partial to an unpredictable varying degree, depending on whether group activities are 
                                                 
1 We wish to express our gratitude to research assistant Torben Mejdahl Poulsen, MSc. 
(Auditing) for his assistance in the collection and registration (SPSS) of data for this 
paper. Frank Thinggaard is professor in financial accounting at Department of Business 
Studies, Aalborg University. Lars Kiertzner is associate professor in accounting and 
auditing at Department of Accounting, Finance and Logistics, Aarhus School of 
Business. 
 
  1placed in the parent company or in subsidiaries. The Danish Financial Statements Act 
(2001) corrected this by also requiring consolidated disclosures. For the time being, these 
disclosures must only be specified for the two auditors individually, in audit fees versus 
other fees. 
 
The analysis of audit fees in all 126 listed non-financial companies
2 on the Copenhagen 
Stock Exchange has two purposes: Firstly, to test a generic, internationally well-
established core audit fee determinants model in order to add to the scarce evidence on 
the determinants of audit fees outside English-speaking countries. This offers insights 
into the question of whether a basic belief in homogeneity across markets is warranted. 
Compared with previous research, which is based primarily on data from the large US, 
UK and Australian capital markets (see Cobbin 2002), the small Danish capital market 
contributes with results from the other end of the scale. This market is further subdivided 
into small and large listed companies. The method of analysis is classical multivariate 
regression. Secondly, to incorporate considerations specific to a Danish context. In this 
respect, we follow the call in Cobbin (2002) to supplement fee models with variables 
which reflect characteristics unique to particular markets, in order to obtain a greater 
understanding and knowledge of factors that differentiate markets. Specifically, we focus 
on the unique Danish legal provision requiring listed companies to be audited by two 
independent auditors and analyze the influence of this joint audit requirement on audit 
fees. These analyses might be of interest to countries considering two auditors as a 
solution to the claimed lack of auditor independence.
3 However, this requirement is to be 
abolished in Denmark on 1/1-2005. In addition, the rather liberal Danish regulation of 
auditor independence and the readily available information on other fees make the Danish 
data very suitable for testing the association between other fees and audit fees. 
 
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 looks at previous 
research, section 3 presents the model used, and section 4 discusses the hypotheses 
analyzed. Data on companies and auditors are presented in section 5, while section 6 
deals with the analyses.   Finally, section 7 presents the summary and implications.  
 
2.0 Previous research 
There have been many studies of the determinants of audit fees. The 1980 paper by 
Simunic is seen as the seminal study, which resulted in the core audit fee determinants 
model. Cobbins (2002) is a review of 56 research studies published in English from 17 
countries, covering the period 1980-2000. This indicates that generic proxy variables for 
client size, complexity and risk profile consistently, and auditor size (Big Eight, Six or 
Four effect) in most cases, influence the level of audit fees in the majority of studies 
using data from English-speaking countries. The review also reveals that only one Nordic 
study and one continental European study were published in this period.  
 
Firth (1997) examined audit fees and other fees paid to the audit firm by listed 
Norwegian companies. This study is especially interesting in relation to our study, since 
Norway and Denmark are both Scandinavian countries with a common historical, cultural 
and, to some extent, legislative and financial background. Firth’s results showed that, 
while client size was the major factor determining the audit fee, contrary to many other 
  2studies, variables measuring audit complexity and proxies for the audit risk involved did 
not attain statistical significance even at the 0.10 level - even though the variables 
typically had the correct sign (Firth, 1997, p. 523). Furthermore, Firth was not able to 
demonstrate that the Big Six auditors generally charged a premium for audit services, 
only weak evidence that Arthur Andersen did. On the other hand, the results also showed 
a positive association between audit fees and other fees, which is consistent with some 
US research. The results were similar across two size categories based on a division of 
the population into smaller/larger-than-median value of total assets. All in all, the results 
from Norway only partially confirm the core audit fee determinants model. However, a 
major shortcoming of the Norwegian study is that the audit fee and other fee data 
collected only relate to the parent company (Firth, 1997, p. 515), and not, as in other 
studies, the consolidated group. This of course could have serious implications for the 
association between audit fees and client factors.
4  
 
The only continental European study was Langendijk’s (1997) study of the market for 
audit services in the Netherlands. Langendijk’s results were similar to other international 
studies insofar as the client size and audit complexity variables were found to be 
determining factors for audit fees in the Netherlands. Apparently, the only variable 
Langendijk included as a proxy for the client’s business risk was a variable for whether 
or not a company was listed on  the official stock exchange. In other words, there was no 
proxy for client financial distress, which is rather uncommon. The proxy for stock 
exchange listing was, however, also significant. On the whole, the core audit fee 
determinants model seemed to fit the Dutch data rather well. However, contrary to most 
of the international studies, Langendijk did not find a fee premium for the Big Six audit 
firms as a group. However, in multivariate regressions with individual Big Six variables 
he was able to demonstrate an audit fee premium for KPMG Peat Marwick relative to 
other Big Six firms in the Netherlands. As shown above, the Norwegian study by Firth 
also found that there was no Big Six effect in general but an individual audit fee premium 
to specific auditing firms. According to Langendijk, this could mean that the reputation 
of Big Six (Four) firms is typically country-related rather than global (Langendijk, 1997, 
p. 263). This will be investigated further in the current study, using Danish data. 
 
Another Nordic audit fee study, carried out by Niemi (2002), focused on risk premiums 
in actual audit fees in Finland. Specifically, he investigated whether an audit fee bears a 
premium for the auditor’s client-specific business risk. Niemi’s study differs from 
conventional audit fee studies in directly controlling for the audit effort through audit 
hours. However, in order to evaluate the effect of the direct measurement of auditor 
effort, he also carried out a conventional analysis based on the core audit fee 
determinants model,
5 which can be seen as an indirect measure of audit effort (Niemi, 
2002, p. 46).  Niemi’s results documented the existence of risk premiums after the direct 
control of audit effort. His results, based on the core audit fee determinants model – 
which is more relevant to the current study - showed lower explanatory power than in 
many other audit fee studies. Only proxy variables for size and new client relationships 
were significant, whereas proxy variables for complexity and risk profile were not 
statistically significant even at the 0.10 level. Niemi (2002, p. 46) himself points out that 
one of the reasons for this difference from the results of international studies might be 
  3that his study is based on audits of single companies, not of groups of companies. In other 
words, neither Niemi´s study nor the Norwegian study is comparable to other 
international studies in this respect.  
 
All in all, very little is known about the determinants of audit fees in continental Europe 
and the Nordic countries, which is one of the reasons for this study of the association 
between audit fees and client factors in Denmark. The current study thus adds to the 
scarce evidence on the determinants of audit fees outside English-speaking countries. Is a 
basic belief in homogeneity across markets warranted? Another reason is the call in 
Cobbin (2002) to supplement fee models with variables that reflect characteristics unique 
to particular markets in order to obtain a greater understanding and knowledge of factors 
which differentiate markets. 
 
3.0 The international core audit fee determinants model and 
specific Danish features 
The international core audit fee determinants model for explaining variations in audit fees 
incorporates proxies for client size on the one hand, and for complexity and risk of the 
subject matter – financial statements and the client’s business – on the other. This paper 
replicates international research on the subject, taking the seminal work of Simunic 
(1980) as the starting point. A similar model is expected to be applicable in Denmark as 
well. 
 
Complexity and risk are subdivided into the following components: 
 
•  Complexity of substance, i.e. complexity in relation to the verifiability of 
financial statement items (typically inherent risks) by an auditor. The risks are 
associated with factors such as the nature of transactions, the accounting 
criteria for recognition and measurement, and the degree of necessary 
professional judgment regarding potential importance of the outcome of future 
events. Thus, the idea is to incorporate a proxy for those financial statement 
items that require more attention from the auditor, since such a proxy would 
presumably be positively correlated with audit fees; 
 
•  Technical (formal) complexity, i.e. complexity in relation to the presentation 
of financial statements after all questions of recognition and measurement 
have been dealt with. This component is often approximated by group 
complexity (number of subsidiaries, number of associated companies). Group 
complexity is assumed to be important because – as pointed out by Firth 
(1997, p. 512) – “The greater the number of subsidiaries the larger are the 
audit hours required due to travel time, learning, the possible different systems 
in place at each subsidiary, and the consolidation exercise.” Other factors 
could be formal requirements regarding the presentation of financial 
statements and disclosures, etc.;  
 
•  General risk associated with the client, where proxies could be leverage, 
liquidity, solvency, loss, etc.  This is actually a measure which tries to capture 
  4the business risk of the auditor – “the probability that an auditor will suffer 
loss or injury in his professional practice” (Jubb et al., 1996). However, it is 
extremely difficult to capture this other than through risk measures associated 
with the client.  The higher the general risk, the more audit work is expected 
to be undertaken to mitigate it and/or the auditor is expected to require a risk 
premium. In both cases a higher audit fee is expected. 
 
Client size, complexity and risk are background variables in the analyses. 
 
Apart from these generic international aspects, the aim of the paper is to systematically 
consider specific Danish features, in line with the call for such initiatives in Cobbin 
(2002), where research in the area is analyzed and categorized. 
These features, together with the background variables, are as follows: 
 
*    The companies are divided into large and small listed companies.  
In general, most Danish listed companies are small by international standards. 
This can be shown by the average market capitalization per listed domestic 
company on selected European stock exchanges, cf. European Stock Exchange 
Statistics, FESE, December 2002:  
       ( € m )    
 Euronext  (Paris/Amsterdam,  Brussels, 
 Lisbon)     1,326 
Deutsche Börse           921 
Helsinki Exchanges           907 
  London Stock Exchange         710 
 Stockholmsbörsen           614 
  Copenhagen Stock Exchange        382 
 Oslo  Börs            365 
 
According to the Datastream database, the market capitalization of non-financial 
companies on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange on December 31, 2002, ranges 
between €1.2m and €8,287.4m, with a median value of €37.5m.
6 Thus, the 
smallest Danish listed companies are very small indeed, and presumably they 
expect auditors to assist in accounting matters to a relatively great extent. 
According to anecdotal evidence from auditors, this assistance is supplementary 
to the audit service and often billed as an integral part of the audit fee. 
 
For small companies, this might imply that client size and technical complexity 
become factors of great importance, whereas complexity of substance and general 
risk are relatively less important factors. 
These expectations rest implicitly on the assumption that size and technical 
complexity are more strongly positively correlated with accounting than with pure 
auditing. 
 
  5In a wider perspective, it could be asked whether auditing really is a standard 
commodity or a diversified product depending for its substance and purpose on 
such factors as client size. This question will not be addressed further here. 
 
*    The special Danish legal provision requiring two auditors in all listed companies. 
In some cases, this provision, which will be abolished on 1/1-2005, means that 
both auditors have significant stakes in an audit , and in other cases that one of 
them is dominant. 
Where both auditors are influential, it might be expected to lead to competition , 
which, in the context of this study, might be even more pronounced because the 
auditors could be trying to establish themselves as the preferred party when the 
two-auditor provision is abolished. This could in turn lead to a negative 
correlation with audit fees compared with the situation where one of the two 
auditors is dominant. The abolishment of the two-auditor provision has been 
known by all parties since 2001. 
 
•  The importance of other fees. 
Until 2004, the regulation of auditor independence has been rather liberal in 
Denmark.
7 This has given Danish auditors ample scope for offering other services 
to their audit clients. The provision of other services by the same firm which 
conducts the audit might lead to an association between the audit fee and the fee 
charged for other services. At first glance, however, it is not clear whether such an 
association would be negative or positive. On the one hand, it might be negative 
due to knowledge spill-overs and cost savings arising from joint provision, which 
could then be passed on to the client. It might also be negative due to the expected 
effect of low-balling on audit fees in order to get access to more lucrative work. 
On the other hand, the association between audit fees and other fees could be 
positive because of events which give rise to the purchase of both more audit and 
non-audit services, e.g. advising a client about the acquisition of a new IT-based 
information system, the acquisition of a foreign subsidiary, or the implementation 
of “value-based reporting” for different segments of the firm, etc. All the 
underlying events might lead to more audit work and thus higher audit fees in the 
short run.
8 The low-balling argument for a negative association might not be 
important where competition in the market for other services is weak, however. 
This is especially the case in Denmark, where the market is dominated by small 
companies with no internal expertise, and where the auditor is, in many cases, 
seen as an obvious first choice for seeking advice. The evidence from 
international research is mixed (Cobbin, 2002; Firth, 1997) – but a majority 
supports the hypothesis of a positive association.  
This is also in line with the results in Firth (1997), based on Norwegian data. The 
results in Ezzamel et al. (2002) give some support for the disaggregated analysis 
of other fees in different categories of services. However, such a breakdown is not 
possible based on published data in Denmark. 
 
•  The Big Four aspect. 
  6Previous research shows that Big Four firms are often in a position to charge a 
premium prize in big economies such as the US and UK, whereas this does not 
always seem to be the case in minor economies such as Denmark (e.g. Firth 
(1997) for Norway and Niemi (2002) for Finland).
9 A premium prize can reflect 
an oligarchic market dominated by prize cartels, a premium for higher litigation 
risk, and/or an extra compensation for a quality audit or for being connected with 
a well known market brand in the capital market. 
Since there are no clear results in other similar markets, and since the litigation 
risk in Denmark can be considered low, it will be investigated whether, without 
any a priori expectations, some or all Big Four firms are in a position to charge 
premium prizes in Denmark.   
 
4.0 Hypotheses 
Hypotheses based on the previous discussion are summarized below. 
 
H1: There is a positive correlation between audit fees and client size, complexity 
and risk in Denmark as in most countries, cf. previous research. 
 
H2: The segment of small listed companies is different from the segment of large 
listed companies insofar as client size and technical complexity are relatively 
more important, and complexity of substance and general risk associated with the 
client relatively less important in an audit of small companies. 
For small companies, it is assumed that the demand for accessory accounting 
assistance is more strongly related to increased client size and technical 
complexity than for large companies, which probably have more internal experts. 
And because the fee for accessory accounting assistance is often billed as part of 
the audit fee in Denmark, it is hypothesized that there is a stronger positive 
association between the audit fee and client size and technical complexity in small 
companies than in large companies. In addition, substantive testing will be 
relatively more used in the audit of a small company than in that of a large 
company, where complexity of substance and risk are more decisive parameters. 
 
H3: The Danish provision regarding two auditors in all listed companies implies a 
negative effect on audit fees when both auditors have significant stakes in the 
audit and thus enjoy significant status with the client. This is the foreseeable 
effect of competitive pressure to emerge as sole auditor when the two-auditor 
provision expires on 1/1-2005. Where one of the auditors is already dominant, no 
such competitive pressure is expected. 
 
H4: Danish auditors can use the audit as a stepping stone to other work for the 
same client without having to give any discount on the audit fee, and the 
underlying events which trigger the consultancy services is simultaneously 
assumed to give rise to additional audit effort. There is therefore expected to be a 
positive correlation between audit fees and other fees. 
 
  7H5: Big Four auditors charge premium prizes due to oligarchic market conditions 
and/or branding effects. 
 
H5 is formulated without reflecting any substantiated a priori expectations in a Danish 
context. The chosen formulation is the common one used in previous research, e.g. based 
on US or UK data. 
 
5.0 Data – Companies and Auditors 
The analyses are based on consolidated data from the 2002 financial statements of all 126 
listed non-financial companies on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange, and for the same 
companies stratified into two equal groups by the variable ∑log  (turnover, assets, 
employees).
10 The log transformation ensures that all three size-indicators influence the 
stratification. 
The stratification into these two groups is pragmatic, the sole purpose of which is to 
divide the population into two strata of the same size. It was first and foremost done to 
test the special Danish hypothesis H2, cf. above, but also to obtain a deeper insight when 
testing the other hypotheses. 
 
Basic data on the two strata are shown in table 1. 
 
 
Table 1 Stratification into large and small companies
*) 
 
                   Turnover    Assets     Employees  
   Number       Average €m         Average €m      Average
  All companies     126           846              875        6,752 
 
  Large companies   63       1,633              1,705      13,237 
 Maximum/ 
  minimum          20,411/90                 22,969/58              248,489/193     
  
  Small companies   63               45        43           268 
 Maximum/ 
  minimum           195/0.4         128/0.9           854/2   
 
*) Converted at the average EURO/DKK rate for 2002: 742.63 
 
 
Both auditors of the companies are shown in table 2 below. Only Big Four firms are 
shown individually. The first auditor is the one who graphically appears as such by virtue 
of his signature on the audit report. Consequently, this classification does not signify that 
he is the dominant auditor. However, in companies with a dominant auditor, it is almost 









Table 2 Big Four firms and other auditors in all 126 listed companies 
 
     First auditor              Second auditor         
       Large  %  Small %   Total  %   Large %  Small %  Total  %
  PWC      16    25   11    17    27      21       6    10    7     11  13     10 
  EY        6    10     4      6    10        8       9    14    1     2  10       8 
  KPMG     24    38   18   29    42      34     16    25    8   13  24     19 
  Deloitte      8    13   12    19    20      16               16    25  10    16  26     21  
  Big Four    54    86   45   71    99      79     47    74  26   41  73     58 
  Other firms      9    14   18   29    27      21      16    26  37   59  53     42 
       63   100   63  100  126   100      63  100  63  100 126   100 
 
 




Table 3 Audit Firms as Auditor No. 1 and Auditor No. 2 
 
    1st. or 2nd. auditor    Large comp.  Small comp.     
    Number  %   Number  %  Number   %
  PWC        40    16      22    17    18     14 
  EY        20      8      15    12      5        4 
  KPMG       66    26      40    32    26      21 
  Deloitte      46    18      24    19    22     17 
  Others       80    32      25    20      55         44 
        252  100    126      100  126       100   
 
 
Table 2 shows that Big Four auditors are first auditors in 79 % of all listed companies and 
second auditors in 58 %. Altogether, the Big Four audit firms are involved in 172 audit 
jobs out of 252 – a total of 68 %. Other firms are primarily second auditors, and to some 
extent first auditors of small companies. Tables 2 and 3 also show that KPMG, Deloitte 
and PWC are dominant as Big Four firms in Denmark, with Ernst & Young in a second 
tier. KPMG is involved in 66 audits (26 % of all audit jobs), 42 of which as first auditor 
and 24 as second auditor. Deloitte is involved in 46 audits (18 % of all audit jobs), 20 of 
which as first auditor. PWC is involved in 40 audits (16 % of all audit jobs), 27 of which 
as first auditor. E&Y is involved in 20 audits (8 % of all audit jobs), half of which as first 
auditor. Thus, KPMG and PWC are primarily first auditors, Deloitte is primarily second 
auditor, and the audit jobs of E&Y are evenly distributed between first and second 
auditor. KPMG or PWC are chosen in 69 out of 99 cases (70 %) where a company has 
appointed a Big Four audit firm as first auditor. 
  9 
These results are further supported by an analysis of the fees, cf. table 4 below. 
 
 
Table 4: Audit Fees and Other Fees (€ ‘000 )
*) 
 
  Fees as Auditor no. 1             Fees as Auditor no. 2              
  Other Fees       Audit Fees          Other Fees      Audit Fees                
            Av.            Av.         Av.                  Av. 
  PWC      14,540    538        9,409     348      5,801    483     1,626       135 
  EY      1,898    190        2,572     257      1,703    170     1,385       139 
  KPMG  13,996    341      14,359     350      5,673    247     7,281       317 
  Deloitte    6,356    318        5,063     253      2,635    101     2,263         87 
  Others    2,816    104        4,278     159         575      11        717         14 
    39,606         35,681      16,387    13,272 
 
*) Converted at the average EURO/DKK rate for 2002: 742.63 
 
The 126 listed companies on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange contribute €105m to the 
audit firms’ turnover – €49m  in audit fees and €56m  for other services. By comparison, 
recently published research sponsored by the Danish Commerce and Companies Agency 
(2004 a and b) shows a total fee from companies with some commercial activities in 
reporting class B of the Danish Financial Statements Act (roughly 71,000 very small 
companies) of approx. €412m. This figure includes audit fees of approx. €147m. 
 
By this comparison, listed companies seem to be of minor significance. Because of the 









Table 5: Other Fees relative to Audit Fees 
 
    Other  Fees/Audit  Fees   
   Auditor No. 1   Auditor no. 2         Total Average
  PWC        1.55        3.56              1.84   
  EY         0.74        1.23             0.91 
  KPMG       0.97        0.78               0.91 
  Deloitte        1.25        1.16              1.23 
  Others       0.66        0.80             0.68 
  Total        1.11        1.23              1.14 
 
 
  10In general, it seems that, in Denmark, other fees are very important measured on an 
international scale. In the UK, other fees average 70-80 % of audit fees, cf. Ezzamel et al. 




6.1 Variables in the Model 
Below, multivariate regression analyses are shown with log (audit fee) as the dependent 
variable, which is the typical choice in international research. The rationale for a 
transformation lies in a strong suggestion that variations in audit fees decline with client 
size (see, for example, Jubb et al., 1996), which suggests a nonlinear correlation between 
audit fees and client sizes. Log transformation is one way to handle nonlinearity.
13 
Appendix 1 shows histograms of this variable. As can be seen, the normal distribution is 
fairly approximated for the population of companies, as well as in the group of large 
companies and the group of small companies individually. Skewness is insignificant. 
 
The independent explanatory background variables from the core audit fee determinants 
model are related to client size, complexity and risk. 
 
Client size is approximated by ∑log (assets, turnover, employees). Appendix 2 shows a 
histogram of this variable fairly approximated to the normal distribution. In previous 
research, other approximations were log (assets), log (turnover) and the square root of 
either assets or turnover. Here, the new proxy is chosen, partly because it seems fair to 
assume client size effects from all three factors, partly because it has the best effects in 
the analyses. 
 
Complexity and general risk are approximated by three different variables in order to 
reflect complexity of substance, technical complexity and business risk in general. 
∑ (inventories, debtors, internally generated intangible assets)/assets is a classical proxy 
for financial statement items for which it is often difficult to obtain sufficient and 
appropriate audit evidence about whether they are free from material misstatement. Other 
approximations for complexity and inherent risks in this regard were tested and shown to 
have less explanatory power.
14 Appendix 3 shows a fairly normally distributed histogram 
of the preferred variable. 
The square root of ∑ (number of subsidiaries, number of associates) was preferred as a 
proxy for technical, or formal, complexity. Similar approximations using square root 
transformations are common in international research on the core audit fee determinants 
model. Some of these alternatives were tested to have less explanatory power.
15 
Appendix 4 shows the distribution of the chosen variable to be clearly skewed to the left. 
In the context of multivariate analyses below, this does not seem to constitute a problem 
since there are no extreme outliers.  
The final variable from the international core audit fee determinants model is leverage, 
defined as the ratio liabilities/numerical equity. This proxy for general risk had more 
explanatory power than other tested approximations.
16 Two small companies caused 
problems because of negative equity. By coincidence, leverage was extremely high in 
both cases, thus appropriately signalling a very high risk. Appendix 5 shows a few 
  11outliers, of which the two cases are the most extreme. The multivariate regressions in the 
next section were made with and without these two outliers, showing no effects on the 
results.
17   
 
In addition to replicating the international core audit fee determinants model, specific 
Danish variables are also considered. 
 
The effect of the legal provision for two auditors is tested by the proxy of whether both 
auditors’ share of total fees exceeds 20 % or not, cf. H3. The threshold for influence, i.e. 
both auditors having significant stakes in the audit, is thus set at 20 % of total fees.
18 
Appendix 6 shows a tabulation of this variable by large and small companies. Cases of 
two influential auditors as well as cases of one dominant auditor are represented equally 
in both strata of listed companies. 
Total fees are used as a presumably better proxy than just audit fees for the distribution of 
influence among the two auditors. A continuous variable is not used, since influence is 
logically an either/or variable, or 0/1 variable. 
 
Influence of other fees. To test hypothesis H4, we use the proxy log (other fees). 
Appendix 7 shows a neat normally distributed histogram of this variable, without outliers. 
 
Big Four firm effects are the third and final special consideration, cf. hypothesis H5. In 
the Danish data, a preliminary regression based on the core audit fee determinants model 
and the specific Danish variables showed no general association between the size of audit 
fees and whether both auditors are Big Four representatives or not.
19 Therefore, four 
different dummy variables for the involvement of one of the four firms as first or second 
auditor were considered in an open-ended search for effects. 
 
6.2 Analyses – results and validation of models 
Three multivariate regression analyses for all companies, the group of large companies 




Company size          Size  ∑ log (assets, turnover, employees)       +   
Complexity of         SubComp  ∑ (inventory, trade debtors, internally     +   
substance     generated  intangible  assets)/assets 
Technical          TechComp Square root of ∑ (subsidiaries,        +  
complexity        associated companies)               
General risk           Risk  Leverage             +  
Provision of Two        TwoAud  Share of total fees exceeds 20 %       - 
Auditors     for  both  auditors 
Influence of Other Fees     OthFees   Log (other fees)           + 
Big Four firm effects         PWC  PWC one of the auditors         ? 
       EY  EY one of the auditors         ? 
       KPMG  KPMG one of the auditors         ?  
       Deloitte  Deloitte one of the auditors         ?  
  12 
The multivariate regression equation is shown in common notation below: 
 
 
Log (Audit Fee) = α + β1Size + β2SubComp + β3TechComp + β4Risk + β5TwoAud +  
   β6OthFees + β7PWC + β8EY + β9KPMG + β10Deloitte + e 
 
The three regression equations, from top to bottom, are: 
 
Total     Large comp.       Small comp.
 
Constant         0.92*                   -1.30           1.49**    
 
Background variables 
S i z e         0.27***        0.28**           0.36*** 
SubComp         0.05                      0.12**                0.01 
TechComp         0.05                     -0.12                    0.29*** 
Risk                     0.06                      0.11*                  0.02     
 
Special Danish variables 
TwoAud     -0.08**                 -0.13**               -0.05     
OthFees       0.68**                  0.87***               0.41*** 
PWC          -0.04                     -0.16**                 0.18** 
EY           0.02           -0.05                   -0.03    
KPMG         -0.01           -0.05                   -0.01 
Deloitte        -0.02               -0.05                   -0.04  
 
R
2                      0.83          0.83             0.66 
F                    58.73        28.91                    12.13 
VIF – maximum                  4.25           4.11             1.88 
Correlation - maximum      0.65           0.74             0.52 
Durbin-Watson        2.34          1.91             1.86     
*** Significant by p<0.01 
**   Significant by 0.01p<0.05 
*     Significant by 0.05<p<0.10 
 
The model assumptions were checked, and did not give rise to any serious concerns. The 
maximum of the Variance Inflation Factor is clearly below 10 and the maximum 
correlation below 0.80, cf. above.
20 Moreover, a chi
2 test of the residuals, e, cannot rule 
out that they might be normally distributed, cf. appendix 8. The values of the Durbin-
Watson testor clearly lie between 1.54 and 2.46, cf. above, which indicates that there is 
neither any positive nor any negative autocorrelation. Finally, scatter plots of log (Audit 
Fee) and the unstandardized residuals, e, are shown in Appendix 9. These plots indicate 
no heteroscedasticity, insofar as the variance of the residuals does not seem to depend in 
any  systematic way on the size of audit fees. The model is thus validated. 
 
  136.3 Results and interpretations 
First, it should be noted that all βvalues show the a priori effects expected except for 
TechComp in the large company regression. The unexpected negative coefficient here is 
not significant, however. Furthermore, the predictive power of the model is noticeably 
lower for small clients than large clients. This is consistent with the findings of previous 
research (see Chan et al., 1993; Cobbin, 2002) and may imply the need for a more refined 
model for small clients. However, the explanatory power of the models used in this paper 
(R
2 0.83 and 0.66) compares well with previous research – even slightly better for the 
segment of small clients.
21
 
The regression results support previous international studies in that the Client Size 
variable is significant in both large (0.01<p<0.05) and especially small companies 
(p<0.01), as well as for the total sample. The results seem to support the assumption that 
the necessary audit effort is increasing at a declining rate in large companies.
22 This 
might be due to better internal controls in large companies and therefore more efficient 
testing, the fact that necessary audit samples are almost independent of population size, 
and that accessory accounting services are most likely to be integrated to a greater extent 
in audit fees by small companies. 
 
As regards other variables from the core audit fee determinants model, the results indicate 
that a distinction must be made between large and small companies. All in all, the core 
audit fee determinants model seems to fit the Danish data rather well in large listed 
companies, whereas fewer variables are statistically significant in the small listed 
companies segment, although they have the correct sign. 
 
With regard to the Complexity variables, it seems that audit fees are significantly 
associated with the technical complexity variable (TechComp) in the stratum of small 
companies (p<0.01), whereas the best, although not as convincing, proxy in the stratum 
of large companies is the measure for substantially complicated financial statement items 
(SubComp) (0.01<p<0.05). 
These results indicate that the accounting technicality of consolidation has some weight 
in a small company, and that perhaps – as indicated by anecdotal evidence - the auditors 
of small companies are often involved in this process in the form of an accessory 
accounting service integrated in the audit. In the audit of a large company, on the other 
hand, traditional considerations of inherent risk in relation to financial statement items 
play the expected role described in audit theory on materiality and risk, although this 
result is weaker. 
Leverage as a proxy for general risk (Risk) is marginally positively correlated with audit 
fees in the stratum of large companies (0.05<p<0.10), but not significant in small 
companies. 
 
On balance, H1, which hypothesized a positive association between audit fees and client 
size, complexity and risk, is reasonably confirmed in the stratum of large companies, 
whereas the results are less convincing for small companies.  
However, it is exactly these divergent results that support H2. In fact, small listed 
companies seem to differ from large listed companies in that client size and technical 
  14complexity are relatively more important factors and complexity of substance and risk 
relatively less important factors in the audit of small companies. 
 
While testing the international core audit fee determinants model on European data is of 
interest in itself, H3, on the effect of a joint audit on audit fees, is of special interest. 
According to H3, the Danish provision for two auditors in all quoted companies implies a 
negative effect on audit fees when both auditors have significant stakes in the audit 
(TwoAud). The results show that the coefficient is negative and statistically significant in 
the large company stratum (0.01<p<0.05). It also has the correct sign in the small 
company stratum, although it is not statistically significant. Thus, the results provide 
some support for a negative relation between audit fees and de facto joint audits.   
Although the negative relation could, in theory, be the result of more efficient audits due 
to shared influence, it seems far more likely to result from competitive pressure among 
auditors jockeying for position as the preferred single auditor in large companies by 1/1-
2005. In other words, it indicates discounts. The reason for finding a statistically 
significant relation in large but not small companies might be because the size of the 
audit fee makes a short-term “battle” seem more attractive in larger companies. 
 
The strongest factor in determining the audit fee is other fees (OthFees). The coefficient 
is positive and highly significant (p<0.01). The results thus support H4. It seems that 
Danish auditors can use the audit engagement as a stepping stone to other work for the 
same client without having to give any discount on the audit fee, and that the underlying 
events which trigger the consultancy services simultaneously give rise to additional audit 
effort..  
H5 -  Big Four auditors charge premium prizes due to oligarchic market conditions and/or 
branding effects – could not be substantiated. No general highballing tendency for Big 
Four firms could be found, contrary to research using,  for example,  US or UK data. 
However, in line with findings from several other countries, including the Netherlands 
(Langendijk 1997) and Norway (Firth 1997), we did find a significant price effect from 
an individual Big Four audit firm. PWC was the only firm found to lowball in the large 
company segment and highball in the small company segment (0.01<p<0.05). PWC is the 
one firm among the Big Four audit firms where other fees are the most important - both 
in total and relative to audit fees. The results might indicate a willingness to give 
discounts on audit fees to comparatively strong, large companies in order to get access to 
more lucrative consultancy jobs. This is not necessary or attractive in small companies, 
maybe because they lack internal expertise and the auditor is, in many cases, regarded as 
the obvious first (or only) choice when seeking advice. On the other hand, it could be that 
PWC performs large company audits more efficiently and effectively involving tighter 
considerations of materiality and risk than other auditors. And perhaps the extra audit fee 
in small companies reflects the additional audit effort needed to reach an acceptable 
assurance level, i.e. a quality or non-compromising audit, or perhaps PWC just has an 
unbeatable reputation in this segment. A final conclusion on this issue is not possible 
based on the available data. 
 
  157.0 Summary and implications 
This paper, which reports the results of a study of audit fees in consolidated group 
accounts of listed companies in Denmark from 2002, adds to the scarce evidence on the 
determinants of audit fees in European countries outside the UK. The Danish capital 
market is small by international standards, and the paper therefore contributes results 
from a different environment than that investigated in previous research. The data are 
used to construct a model of the determinants of audit fees, which is partly based on the 
international core audit fee determinants model and partly on specific Danish features. 
 
The results show that a distinction must be made between large and small companies 
(based on a cutoff at the median for our size variable). In the large company segment, the 
core audit fee determinants model seems to fit the Danish data rather well. Variables 
measuring size and complex financial statement items which require more attention from 
the auditor have both the correct sign and are statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and 
a variable proxying for the client’s business risk is significant at the 0.10 level. However, 
a variable proxying for technical (formal) complexity – measured by the number of 
subsidiaries and associated companies – was not statistically significant (nor did it have 
the correct sign) in this segment. The results indicate that, in large companies, traditional 
considerations of inherent risks in relation to financial statement items play the expected 
role described in audit theory on materiality and risk. 
 
In the small company segment, fewer variables from the core audit fee determinants 
model were statistically significant, although they all have the correct sign. However, 
variables measuring size and technical (formal) complexity were found to be highly 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. According to anecdotal evidence, auditors of 
small companies are often involved in the accounting technicality of consolidation, which 
is provided as an accessory accounting service integrated in the audit and billed as part of 
the audit fee. This and a greater extent of substantive testing might replace the traditional 
textbook considerations of materiality and risk in the audit of a small company and thus 
explain the results. A closer understanding cannot be determined from the data in this 
paper. Case studies would be necessary for a deeper insight. 
 
Of particular interest in the paper is the investigation of the effect of two independent 
auditors on audit fees, which is mandatory in all Danish listed companies. Specifically, 
we focused on the effect where both auditors have significant stakes in the audit and thus 
enjoy significant status with the client. Again, the results show that a distinction must be 
made between large and small companies. In the large company segment the effect is 
negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level, whereas the applied variable has the 
correct sign in the small company segment but is not statistically significant. The 
negative relation could be a general result due to competitive pressure among joint 
auditors. However, we find it more likely to result from competitive pressure among the 
auditors jockeying for the position of preferred single auditor in large companies when 
the legal provision requiring two auditors is abolished by 1/1-2005 . 
 
The rather liberal Danish regulation on auditor independence and the readily available 
information on other fees make the Danish data very suitable to test for an association 
  16between other fees and audit fees. Our results confirm international findings of a positive 
association between other fees and audit fees. In fact, other fees seem to be the strongest 
factor in determining the audit fee in both large and small companies. Thus, it seems that 
Danish auditors can use the audit engagement as a stepping stone to other work for the 
same client without having to give any discount on the audit fee, and that the underlying 
events which trigger the other services simultaneously gives rise to additional audit 
effort. 
 
Finally, consistent with research based on data from small capital markets, but in contrast 
to the findings based on data from major economies such as the US and UK, our results 
show no indication that the Big Four audit firms charge premium prizes. However, we 
did find an individual Big Four firm effect. The results indicate that PWC is lowballing in 
the large company segment and highballing in the small company segment. PWC is the 
one firm among the Big Four audit firms where other fees are the most important - both 
in total and relative to audit fees. Perhaps there is a willingness to lowball in 
comparatively strong large companies in order to get access to other work, whereas such 
an approach is not necessary in  relatively weak small companies. On the other hand, 
PWC might be performing audits more efficiently and effectively involving tighter 
considerations of materiality and risk than other audit firms. However, based on the data 
here, this cannot be analyzed in detail. 
 
All in all, our results indicate that a basic belief in homogeneity across markets is 
warranted for large companies but not for small companies. For small companies, more 
refined audit fee determinants models may need to be developed. 
 
Future research could investigate audit fees in other small capital markets and/or in 
companies not listed on the stock exchange, e.g. to determine whether the distinction 
between large and small companies is justified. 
 
Other promising research topics include : 
 
•  The effects of Sarbanes Oxley. The provision of a special auditor’s report on 
internal controls may lead to increasing audit fees in the companies directly or 
indirectly affected; 
•  The effects from a breakdown of other fees into fees for other assurance 
engagements, tax advisory services and other engagements. It will probably be 
possible to test for this effect in the future, cf. the drafted changes in the 4th. 
Directive and the 7th.  Directive in connection with the EU Commission’s 
draft 8th. Directive.
23 
•  The possibility of more finely-tuned models and analyses following a wider 
scope of research than in this paper, e.g. better tuning of size variables and 





  17Future research specific to Denmark could include: 
 
•  The stricter Danish legislation on auditor independence in the new auditors´ 
act of 22/4-2003. This might loosen the tight connection between audit fees 
and other fees because more engagements in the future will be seen as 
compromising auditor independence; 
•  The abolishment of the two-auditor requirement may lead to increasing 
competition between the two auditors, since the 2004 financial statements will 
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  19Appendix 1: Histograms – log (audit fee) 
The natural logarithm of total audit fee – showing normal 
distributions 
 
All Listed Companies 













































  20Segment of Large Listed Companies 





























Skewness -0.641 (Standard Error 0.309)  Kurtosis 1.951 (Standard Error 0.608) 
Segment of Small Listed Companies 































Skewness -0.243 (Standard Error 0.309)  Kurtosis 1.268 (Standard Error 0.608) 
 
  21Appendix 2: Histogram - Size 
Company Size measured as ∑log (assets, turnover, employees) – 
showing normal distribution 
 








































  22Appendix 3: Histogram – SubComp 
Complexity of Substance measured as ∑ (inventories, debtors, 











































  23Appendix 4: Histogram - TechComp 
Technical Complexity measured as the Square root of ∑ (number 
of subsidiaries, number of associates) 
 












































  24Appendix 5: Histogram - Risk 
General risk measured as leverage (Liabilities/Numerical Equity) 
 




















Std. Dev = 3,27  
Mean = 2,0
N = 126,00
   






















  25Appendix 6: The two auditors’ shares of total fees (TwoAud) 
 
Table – both auditors at least 20 % of total fees  
 
  
Both auditors at least 20% of total fees * Two strata of companies  
Cross-tabulation 
  





companies  Total 
No  34 37 71 Both auditors 
at least 20% of 
total fees 
Yes  28 24 52




























  26Appendiks 7: Histogram - Log (other fees) – 
Importance of other engagements measured as log (other fees) –

















































  27Appendix 8 
Chi
2-test of residuals (e) by multivariate regressions for normal 
distribution 
 
       All companies        Large companies    Small companies     
Class 1       9                5      6             
Class 2       9                5        6 
Class  3    14    6    5 
Class 4     15              10      5 
Class 5     13                3      7 
Class 6     11                6      8 
Class 7     15                4      6 
Class 8       9                4      4 
Class  9    13    9    4 
Class 10      9                 6      7 
              117              58                        58 
Chi
2                         5.137         7.517           2.690   
Degrees of freedom    9                9      9 


























  28Appendix 9: Plot of  unstandardized residuals and log (audit fee) 
 
All Listed Companies 
 
Logarithm (total audit fee)




















































  29Large Listed Companies 
Logarithm (total audit fee)
































Small Listed Companies 
Logarithm (total audit fee)
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1 See, for instance, Nobes and Parker (2002), p. 304-305. 
2 As in the bulk of audit fee research, companies in the financial sector are left out 
because of their clearly special position.  Where they are considered, the purpose is to 
shed some light on their position (typically by including a 0/1 variable), which is not the 
aim of this paper. 
3 Ezzamel et al. (2002) speculate on the effect of competitive pressure between 
incumbent and non-incumbent auditors in relation to non-audit services. 
4 For instance, Firth – in line with the core fee determinants model – includes a variable 
for the number of subsidiaries as a proxy for complexity. A parent company would 
normally not be charged for the audit of subsidiaries. Thus, the relation between this 
proxy and audit fees would be different where data are collected from group accounts. 
Furthermore, the audit fee for pure holding companies would normally be a small fraction 
of the audit fee for the whole group. 
5 Excluding other fees due to lack of data (Niemi, 2002, p. 47), and, surprisingly, 
excluding variables proxying for financial statement items which require more attention 
from the auditor (such as inventory and receivables to total assets). 
6 A few extreme values and small football and handball clubs were manually excluded. 
7 New legislation in late-2003 ensured implementation of the EU Recommendation on 
independence and thereby harmonization, which meant stricter rules in Denmark. 
8 Some of these effects are likely to be captured by the proxies for complexity in the core 
audit fee determinants model, although they may be too crude to capture all of them. 
9 Nor did the study by Langendijk (1997), based on Dutch data, demonstrate a 
statistically significant Big Six effect. 
10 The chosen stratification was subjected to sensitivity analyses through alternative 
stratifications based on turnover, assets or employees respectively. For 110 of the 126 
companies, all three alternative stratifications were consistent with the chosen one. Eight 
large companies were classified as small in one (six) or two (two) alternatives, and eight 
small companies were large in one (six) or two (two) dimensions. These sixteen 
companies were reconsidered, which did not lead to any corrections of the mechanically 
chosen stratification. 
11 The first auditor earns more than 50 % of total fees in 80 % of the companies, and 
more than 50 % of audit fees in 85 % of the companies. He thus becomes the dominant 
auditor, earning more than 80 % of total fees and audit fees in 55% and 53 % of the 
companies respectively. 
12 To test for a possible prestige effect on audit fees, a 0/1 variable for stockmarket 
exposure was tested. Exposed companies were the 31 in the KFX index and Midcap. No 
such effect was found.  
13 As an alternative, the square root or natural log of audit fees is used. In addition to this, 
audit fees/assets can also be found in previous research. The latter seems inappropriate 
because it involves client size effects on both sides of the equation. Pong and Whittington 
(1994) argue for no transformation at all, but their alternative approach has mostly been 
rejected in international research. 
14 Tested approximations for complexity of substance were each factor relative to assets 
(inventories/assets, debtors/assets and internally generated intangible assets/assets), and 
such factors as whether hedging was described under accounting principles or not, 
whether the company was following IFRS regulation or not, and whether the company 
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was a production company or in other trades, hypothesizing other trades to be 
substantially more complex.  
15 Other approximations for technical complexity considered were the share of consolida-
ted turnover or the share of employees in subsidiaries, and the square root of the number 
of subsidiaries. 
16 Other tested approximations for general risk were ROA, loss 2001, loss 2002, loss 
2001 and 2002, development in the result of operations from 2001 to 2002, and solvency. 
17 The multivariate analyses showed no significant effect of leverage, neither with nor 
without the two outliers. 
18 Using 30 % or 40 % as the cutoff point was tested and gave similar results as the 20 % 
limit in this paper. 
19 This was the result of multivariate regression analyses, in which a 0/1 variable with the 
value of 1 if both auditors were from a Big Four firm replaced the aforementioned 0/1 
variables with the value of 1 if PWC, EY, KPMG or Deloitte were one of the two 
auditors. Multivariate regressions for all companies, as well as for the group of large 
companies and the group of small companies individually, all showed no overall effect. 
20 There are maximum correlations of 0.65 in the total model and 0.74 in the model for 
large companies between Size and TechComp respectively, while there is a maximum 
correlation of 0.52 in the model for small companies between Deloitte and KPMG. 
21 Cobbin (2002) reports adj. R
2 in the range 51% to 90% in the UK, with the majority 
around the 80% level, and almost the same range for US studies. 
22 This relationship can be illustrated by an analysis of the variable: 
 
1.000.000 * audit fee/average(turnover, assets, 1.000.000 * employees) 
 
In the stratum of small companies the mean of this variable is 2.08, as opposed to 0.42 in 
the stratum of large companies. A t-test shows varying means by p=0.08. 
23 Cf. the draft Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on statutory 
audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts, and amending Council Directives 
78660/ EEC and 83/349/EEC, 03.16. 2004.   
  32Working Papers from Financial Reporting Research Group 
 
 
R-2005-02  Frank Thinggaard & Lars Kiertzner: The effects of two auditors and non-
audit services on audit fees: evidence from a small capital market. 
 
R-2005-01  Lars Kiertzner: Tendenser i en ny international revisionsstandardisering 
  - relevante forskningsspørgsmål i en dansk kontekst. 
 
R-2004-02  Claus Holm & Bent Warming-Rasmussen: Outline of the transition from 
national to international audit regulation in Denmark. 
 
R-2004-01  Finn Schøler: The quality of accruals and earnings – and the market pricing 













ISBN 87-7882-030-8  
Department of Accounting, Finance and Logistics 
 
Aarhus School of Business 
Fuglesangs Allé 4 
DK-8210 Aarhus V - Denmark 
 
Tel. +45 89 48 66 88 
Fax +45 86 15 01 88 
 
www.asb.dk  
 
 
 